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We investigate the cross scalar linkages between every day violence and global war on 
terror in the context of urban Pakistan. We draw upon intensive research undertaken in the 
twin cities of Rawalpindi/Islamabad and Karachi to highlight how marginalized Pashtun and 
Bengali Rohingya communities experience state and everyday violence in the context of the 
global war on terror. Focusing on the gendered aspects of infrastructural and spectacular 
violence, we argue that every day violence too, is deeply politicised and inflected by 
national and global level geopolitics. Following Hannah Arendt, we conceptualize violence as 
a manifestation of a loss of power. Accordingly, drawing upon ethnographic evidence we 
demonstrate how even domestic violence takes on a public and a political valence. We 
argue that performances of masculinities and femininities are, in fact, imbricated with 
geographies of exclusion, marginalization and state policies. The routinization of violence in 
everyday spaces draws attention to the DNA like relationality of the local with the 
geopolitical at the global and national scales.































































Terror is geographical (Mustafa 2005), just as violence is socio-spatial (Blomley 2003, Tyner 
2012). How does the global scale geography of terrorism and the so called ‘War’ on it, 
intersect with the texture of everyday violent spaces? It is a live question, which has been 
engaged with conceptually (e.g., Pain 2014), but rarely been grounded in empirical evidence. 
The question becomes particularly germane to spaces at the periphery of the global 
structures of power, like Pakistan which are, in fact, at the epicenter of the neo-realist, 
militarist geopolitics of anti-terrorism, and its well-known manifestation the ‘global war on 
terror’ (GWOT) (Rashid 2009). The blow back of the GWOT on Pakistan is not just limited to 
suicide bombings, drone attacks and more dramatic acts of violence, but we argue, also in the 
texture of everyday spaces and the violence experienced therein. The Pakistani state’s 
involvement in the war on terror intersects with the societal changes wrought by consumerist 
neo-liberalism under the conditions of late capitalism (Mustafa and Sawas 2014, Maqsood 
2013) to spawn deeply gendered, violent geographies. We use the case studies of two urban 
areas of Rawalpindi/Islamabad and the megalopolis of Karachi, to understand how 
international scale geopolitics of GWOT, along with consumerist neoliberalism, refract the 
production, and gendered experiences of everyday violent spaces in urban Pakistan. 
Rawalpindi/Islamabad, a medium sized conurbation, represents the best that the Pakistan 
has to offer in urbanity, and Karachi the greatest urban challenge.
In investigating the gendered geography of every day violence, we do not limit ourselves to 
equating concern with gender to be with women alone. In fact, we are concerned with both 
femininities and masculinities and how constructions and performances of both make one 
susceptible to violence (Srivastava 2012, Datta 2012). Therefore, while being attentive to 
feminist insights on violence (e.g., see Pain 2014, Staehli et al. 2004, Staehli and Nagel 2008, 
Bhattacharya 2008, Kirby 2013), we cast a more inclusive net, by asking what are the dynamic 
interactions between masculinities, femininities, and different types of violence--from 
spectacular terrorist violence to, more routinized criminal, state and infrastructural violence. 
We use the term infrastructural violence, which we define as how the design and access, or 
lack thereof, to the urban infrastructure may be directly linked to violent outcomes (Rogers 
and O’Neill 2012; Ferguson 2012). Also, we understand violence in its physical sense following 
Mitchell (1996) of either the actuality of physical harm or threat thereof, either gratuitously, 
or to proscribe someone’s behavior. We deliberately made the choice of engaging with 
violence in its physical sense, and not in its equally legitimate, and perhaps conceptually richer 
abstract sense (Galtung 1969, Tyner and Inwood 2014). This is primarily because, the 
empirical case studies where even the somewhat narrower physical understanding of 
violence had such a loud resonance in social life, just engaging violence in its crass physical 
form seemed a daunting enough task of framing and explanation.
We focus on the case studies of two of the poorest and most vulnerable neighborhoods of Ali 
Akbar Shah Goth (AASG) and Afghan Basti in Karachi and Islamabad, respectively (Anwar et 
al. 2017). AASG is an informal settlement grown around what was previously a fishing village, 
in Union Council Ibrahim Hyderi, right next to Pakistan’s second biggest port of Bin Qasim in 
eastern Karachi (Figure 1). The estimated 60,000 strong population of Ali Akbar Shah Goth is 






























































Basti in Islamabad (Figure 2), was an informal squatter settlement primarily with a population 
of approximately 8000 Pashtu speaking Pashtun migrants from Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) 
province of Pakistan, and some smattering of Afghan refugees. The settlement was bulldozed 
by the authorities in the name of security in August 2015, with the plea that the residents 
were not Pakistanis, but instead Afghan refugees who harbored terrorist and criminal 
elements (Zahid 2015, Saleemi 2015). The ethno-linguistic minority character of the 
population of the two neighborhoods, and how that character intersected with the state 
narrative about terror, security, and citizenship forms the fulcrum of our analysis of the 
linkages between GWOT and everyday violence in the two cities. 






























































Figure 2: Location of Afghan Basti (I-11/4 – see red circle) in Islamabad.
From Global Terror to Everyday Violence
The GWOT terminology may have gone out of fashion with the passing on of the Bush 
administration in the United States, but the actual practices of militarist counter terrorism 
continued with all the vigour in the West and South Asia, under the Obama administration 
(Shaw and Akhter 2012 & 2014). Now with the rise of even more virulent xenophobic and 
Islamophobic politics in the West, the future for GWOT like geopolitics seems perilously 
bright. The GWOT was, and continues to be a practice of geopolitics predicated upon a state 
centric model of the world (Dalby 2003), and binary geographical imaginaries (Stephens 
2011). It was also a practice of geopolitics that was about place making, defining a hierarchy 
of spaces and representing actors as de-territorialized threats, which must be confronted 
without regard to the territorial boundaries of sovereign states, on the plea that ‘fragile 
states’ were not able to exercise their sovereignty in those spaces (Flint and Radil 2007, Elden 
2007, Coleman 2003). The overt military interventions of the United States and its Western 
allies have been discussed and critiqued extensively in the literature (e.g. see Anderson 2011, 
Gregory 2010, Gregory and Pred 2006, Jones and Clarke 2006, Ettlinger and Bosco 2004), 
especially with regard to Pakistan and Afghanistan (e.g. see Shaw and Akhter 2014, Hussain 
2010, O’Loughlin et al. 2010). The non-military, but directly and indirectly security related 
aspects of GWOT have also gained some attention, e.g., border controls (Amoore 2006), 
financial transactions (Amoore and Goede 2008) and leveraging of fear to attack domestic 
opponents and movements (Woon 2011), to name a few. In the case of Pakistan, however, 






























































understood and documented, particularly as they link to the everyday and the mundane 
violent spaces (for exceptions see Flury 2011, Ahmed and Avoine 2018).
Everyday violence and violent geographies, meanwhile have started gaining increasing 
attention from geographers (e.g., see McIlwaine 1999, Gregory and Pred 2007, Mehta and 
Bondi 2010, and Tyner and Inwood 2014) and from the international development 
community of practice (e.g., see Anwar et al. 2015, WHO 1996). The everyday violence has an 
inescapable gender dimension to it, much the same as everything else in social life, and hence 
everyday violence and violent geographies cannot possibly be parsed without engaging with 
the attendant gender fault lines and contestations (Brickell and Maddrell 2016, Pain 2015). 
The policy engagement with the question of global and domestic terrorism, and then 
everyday violence is scale delimited, where each of the categories match with static macro-
global, meso-national and sub-national and micro-local scales, respectively (Flint and Radil 
2007). Concomitantly, the macro and micro are imbued with political valence and meaning, 
whilst the local is often (perhaps unhelpfully) deemed to be apolitical and more in the realm 
of criminal and domestic violence (Katz 2007, Pain 2015). It is well understood that scale is 
not an a priori category but an outcome of socio-spatial processes where geographical scales 
change, intersect and are in fact, produced for deeply politicized reasons (Hewitt 2001, Smith 
1984, Legg 2009 and for a critique also see Marston et al. 2005). 
Feminist geographers in a somewhat comparable register have argued for paying attention 
to how everyday violence is complicated and enabled by entrenched inequalities and 
intersectionalities cutting across spatial scales (Pain and Staehli 2014, Dowler 2012). Toxic 
masculinist geopolitics, for example, that may instigate wars motivated by the savior complex 
are not irrelevant to the toxic masculinities that play out in the everyday, across the so-called 
East and West, North and South, here and there divide (Flury 2009 & 2011, Dowler 2012, Pain 
2014). As Pain and Smith (2008) argue; events, encounters, affects, cultural tropes, ideologies 
and politics that connect and permeate geopolitics and everyday life, do not have a stable 
hierarchical structure. In fact, the linkages are characterized by instabilities, discontinuities 
and unexpected configurations that constantly co-produce everyday life and geopolitics. 
Hence, the image of the DNA like relationality of global geopolitics, specifically GWOT and 
everyday violent spaces that we invoke here for our case study of Karachi and Islamabad (Also 
see Pain 2014). The image of the DNA to our mind best captures scalar, affective, functional 
and political entanglements between the global capital, militarism and the gendered 
corporeal experiences of violence in everyday spaces (e.g., also see Fluri and Piedalue 2017, 
Fluri 2011 and Pain 2015, Maqsood 2013). 
Our discussion and interpretation of violence is rooted in our theorization of it, following 
Arendt (1973) as symptomatic of a loss of power. The ‘knowledge/power’ flowing from the 
actors’ socialization into webs of knowledge and discourses that induce internalization of 
certain social relations and world views as natural and desirable (Foucault, 1980) is the most 
comprehensive form of power. It is the loss of this type of power, that we maintain following 
Arendt (1973) underlies violence, and not as a tactic that accrues more power to the 
perpetrator (e.g. Mustafa 2002).
As mentioned above, we consider three types of violence, (1) spectacular terrorist violence 






























































2007); (2) geographical places and infrastructure therein that enable violence (Lefebrve, 
1991; Anand, 2012; Ferguson, 2012); and (3) structural violence (Galtung, 1969). We focus on 
the first two, as they by themselves present enough of a conceptual challenge of linking 
theory with evidence in this paper. While the first type of terrorist violence has been typically 
conceptualized at the international geopolitical and then at the nation state scale, we 
nevertheless consider local manifestations of it—everyday spectacular violence that changes 
the texture of spaces and places. The second type of violence that we call ‘infrastructural 
violence’ draws attention, to how prison camps, surveillance and police presence, for 
example, may produce carceral geographies associated with the state oppression on the one 
hand (e.g. see Hewitt 2001), and design of urban living spaces, which may perpetuate 
gendered isolation, confinement or social alienation on the other (Ferguson 2012, Scott 
1998). We will demonstrate through our case studies the scalar linkages between terrorist 
and infrastructural violence, and how the experience of them intersects with gendered 
identities and expectations.
Pakistan is a federal republic comprising four provinces: Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Punjab, Sindh 
and Baluchistan. Since independence from British rule in 1947, Pakistan has relied on 
centralized structures of federal governance. Its bureaucracy and military elites have copied 
the institutional and organizational style of the colonial state (Jalal 1995) with little room for 
democratic articulation. Authoritarian tradition and military rule have shaped the structures 
of governance. This has meant not only an unabashed reliance on centralized, elite-backed 
visions, but also the undermining of democratic politics (Abbas 2005, Siddiqa 2011a). But 
despite a democratic turn since 2008 at the provincial and national scale, governance 
structures at the local and city scale which paradoxically had been devolved and democratized 
under the semi-military regime from 2001-2008, were in fact rolled back by the new 
democratic dispensations. Some argued that it was to ensure continuation of patronage 
politics by provincial and national level politicians (Mustafa and Sawas 2013, Akhter 2017). 
The Pakistani state’s role in the GWOT and related security policies, further complicate 
domestic politics and matters of urban governance. Pakistan has been the main ally of the 
United States since the start of the war on Al Qaeda and other terrorist outfits in 2001. With 
time, Pakistan’s role has become more important due to the threats in Afghanistan that have 
also expanded into Pakistan (Siddiqa 2011b). At the outset of the GWOT Pakistan found itself 
under a military regime of General Pervaiz Musharraf with limited political legitimacy. The 
military ruler of Pakistan at the time, chose to align himself with the ethno-nationalist 
Mutahida Qaumi Movement (MQM) in urban Sindh, including Karachi, to shore up his political 
support in the governance structure he had put in place (Gayer 2014, Anwar 2014, Verkaaik 
2004). The MQM is a secular leaning party representing the Urdu speaking people (known as 
Mohajirs) who had migrated from, what is now, India at the time of independence in 1947. 
General Musharraf was from the same community in Karachi. The party had established a 
monopoly of political power, especially in Karachi earlier on, and was often accused of 
supporting criminal enterprises. It had been the subject of a military operation in the 1990s, 
but was rehabilitated by the Musharraf regime (Gayer 2007). The party is also often touted 
to be strongly aligned with Western intelligence agencies whose interests converged with its 
secular leanings, and the GWOT imperatives of the government of Pakistan. The result was 
the state turning a blind eye to its criminal activities in return for it denying space to religiously 






























































to Verkaaik (2016), ethnic identity politics and violence in urban Sindh have often gone hand 
in hand since the 1970s, with MQM in particular seeking to portray itself as a violent “militant 
group willing to fight for the rights of Muhajirs” (p: 851). As Anwar (2014) documents in case 
of AASG, the Bengali and Rohinga population of the locality were pressed into service by the 
MQM in the 1990s as part of the vote bank politics. Subsequent to the delegitimation of the 
same peoples’ citizenship in the securitized environment after 911, MQM induced them to 
work for the party with a vague promise of getting them back their citizenship rights. 
As threats of militancy peaked in the later part of 2000s, even under the civilian dispensation, 
the military assumed control of the national plan to address terrorism, and through 
amendments in the Citizenship Act and Foreigners Ordinance, the state proceeded to 
disenfranchise many ethnic minorities (Anwar 2013, Rumi 2015). A series of military 
operations were launched targeting militants in Pakistan’s northern regions, bordering 
Afghanistan, and in urban centers such as Karachi. In 2013, an extensive para-military 
Rangers’ operation was launched in Karachi to ‘cleanse’ the city from terrorists. This time, the 
military took on the MQM for the second time, under the pretext that its criminal violence 
was in fact, at the behest of the arch rival India. These operations have visibly brought down 
levels of non-state violence and crime in Karachi (Rehman 2017), hence the process has 
facilitated the remit of state violence to expand. The Pashtuns and other ethnic minorities 
with dubious credentials of Pakistaniness, e.g., the Rohingyas and the Bengalis, were further 
victimized as a result of the new operations (Anwar 2013, Baloch and Mughal 2017). The 
Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP) has reported an increased number of civilian 
deaths in Karachi due to ‘encounter killings’ 1 and arbitrary detention (Ahmed 2017). 
Alongside this, the Pakistani state is now expelling hundreds of thousands of Afghan refugees, 
many of whom have lived in Pakistan for nearly 40 years. Deportation threats, and police 
abuses have pushed out 365,000 of Pakistan’s 1.5 million registered Afghan refugees, and 
over 20,000 of the estimated one million undocumented refugees. The Pakistani state’s 
conflation of refugees with terrorism is being used to justify the policy of forced expulsions 
(Alimia 2017). But even beyond the Afghan refugees, even the internally displaced people 
from Pakistan’s former Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) are being rolled up in the 
anti-Afghan operations.              
In addition to the above, new infrastructure projects under the China Pakistan Economic 
Corridor (CPEC), which has become a national theme, are also legitimizing state control. The 
CPEC is providing legitimacy for army interventions that cover everything from long-standing 
suspicions towards ‘outsiders’ to the history of militancy and everyday violence in Pakistan. 
In August 2016, then Chief of Army Staff General Raheel Sahrif declared a suicide attack on a 
hospital in Quetta an attack on CPEC which “enemies of the country” wanted to sabotage 
(Dawn 2016). Hence, in Karachi and Rawalpindi/Islamabad, the different and overlapping 
permutations of violence unfold in the broader context of state policies that are deeply 
enmeshed in the security related aspects of the GWOT on the one hand, and desire for foreign 
investments (mostly Chinese) to facilitate capitalist development, on the other.   
The wider project on which this manuscript is based, undertook approximately 2,445 
questionnaire surveys, close to 60 ethnographic style interviews, participant observations, 






























































participatory photography, media monitoring, secondary literature review and some key 
informant interviews in 12 working class urban neighborhoods of Rawalpindi/Islamabad 
conurbation and Karachi. In AASG and Afghan Basti, 445 and 129 semi-structured 
questionnaires were administered, along with six detailed ethnographic style interviews in 
each neighborhood, respectively. The project has focused on the material and discursive 
drivers of gender roles and their relevance to configuring violent geographies, but along the 
way the linkages and symbiosis with the GWOT and state policies emerged as salient 
contributors to violence, especially in the two communities. Unfortunately, we did not have 
any transgender people in our sample, hence we must limit ourselves to the discussion of 
masculinities and femininities in the following section, to set the context for a discussion of 
the relationship between GWOT and everyday violence in the following section.
Masculinities and Femininities in Violent Spaces
Gender roles are enacted and embodied, and the repetitive enactment of those gives them 
the appearance of normality or even naturalness. But they have to be enacted somewhere, 
and the question of where and the spatiality thereof is, in fact, integral to the question of 
gender (Halvorson 2005, Falah and Nagel 2005; Bondi, 2005). In the two neighborhoods of 
AASG and former Afghan Basti, femininities and masculinities, end up being discursively 
constructed and materially enacted in spatially diverse idioms and practices. The Pashtun 
dominated Afghan Basti’s population is mostly comprised of either rural migrants from KP, 
and some internally displaced families from FATA who had existing connections in the area 
with prior migrants. The dominant idiom for articulating masculinity and hence its binary 
opposite femininity was ethnic, i.e., we must behave or believe the way we do, because we 
are Pashtun, e.g.,
Madam, do not get angry but we, Pathans are a little orthodox. We do not allow our 
women to work except the chores within the house. We do not allow them to go 
outside. I only do this hard work so that I can feed my children. If I am fulfilling their 
needs, then why do women need to work? [see Figure 6] (Male Respondent A, Afghan 
Basti Circa 2014 to the female researchers).
We are Pashtun and we don’t believe in the concept of love marriage. My marriage 
was totally arranged, and my in-laws were our relatives. My husband was my first 
cousin, that’s why I married here (Female respondent A, Afghan Basti, Circa 2014).
No, we don’t allow our females to go out for work in any case. Unlike Punjabi people 
we can starve but we cannot let our women earn. It is our insult (Male respondent B, 
Afghan Basti, Circa 2014).
As we Pashtun people say in our language, ‘Woman is either for the home or for the 
grave’ (Male respondent ISL-AA-75, Afghan Basti, Circa 2014)
Pashtun masculinity has been a source of considerable scholarly and popular attention and 
has been celebrated in an almost orientalist register as that of a noble savage. The colonial 






























































construction of them as a martial race (e.g. see Caroe 1958). The contemporary Pakistani 
society externally, and the Pashtun nationalists’ and intellectuals’ internal self-image of the 
Pashtun men is that of proud, independent and martial people (e.g. see Khan 1993). The 
martial race myth was liberally leveraged during the Afghan war against the Soviets by the 
Pakistani state and its U.S. and Saudi allies to mobilize Afghan Pashtuns, as well as the 
Pakistani Pashtuns to participate in the Jihad against the Soviet infidels (Allan 2001, Malik 
2016). The same constructions contemporaneously are frequently used by the Pakistani right 
and the left to frame their views of the GWOT, Taliban insurgency, drone attacks and the 
American role in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Such essentialization of ethnic identity is 
problematic on many counts and its authenticity is irrelevant, insofar as these discourses end 
up producing and reproducing social practice in profoundly problematic ways. Misogyny is 
one of the common outcomes of such constructions of hyper-masculinity and the Pashtun 
society is no exception (Ahmad and Avoine 2015). 
The mostly illiterate population of Afghan Basti had not necessarily read all of these accounts, 
but as documented by Titus (1998) such colonial stereotypes do have a legitimacy within 
ethnic groups in Pakistan, including the ethnicities that the stereotypes are about. The 
Pashtun masculinity is not exceptional in its misogynistic manifestation, especially among 
Pakistan’s other ethnicities, e.g. for Punjabis (Partners4Prevention, undated), Shina 
(Halvorson 2005), Sindhi, and Baloch to name a few. But our Pashtun respondents’ 
construction of masculinity was profoundly imbricated, to the extent of being almost a 
caricature, with the Pakistani state’s and the colonial and post-colonial literature’s 
representations of them (e.g. see Titus 1998). While more analytically scholastic historical and 
sociological accounts have introduced considerable nuance to the stereotype of the noble 
savage, and there is documented diversity in how Pashtun gender is enacted across space and 
time (e.g. see Kakar 2005), the popular culture continues to rabidly hold on to it. Many 
Pashtun and non-Pashtun observers have lamented the toxic legacy of this stereotype 
especially for gender relations (Manchanda 2015). Nevertheless, the stereotype along with 
the particular traumatized pathologies of an internally displaced, marginalized, poor and 
stigmatized population overlap to produce a particularly toxic brand of masculinity (for a 
comparable account see Achilli 2015). Gendered social practice in Afghan Basti, on the other 
hand is not just about women not having any agency, they continue to exercise considerable 
authority in terms of proscribing their men’s behavior vis-à-vis second marriage or consorting 
with other women:
Brother in law of the Female respondent: I try to make them understand to let us 
marry a girl from Islamabad but they don’t let us do that
Female respondent: that, as long as we [women] are alive, is not going to happen!
Researcher: We thought Pashtun men are very dominant and they can go for second 
marriage without taking consent from their first wife?
Female respondent: That is not the case. Where the hell will they go if they do that? I 
will not stand for my husband going for a second marriage! (Female respondent N, 
Afghan basti, Circa 2014).
Also, the gender roles are intertwined with multiple strands, mostly to do with the material 































































In case of the Rohingya and Bengali people in AASG, the customary fisher livelihoods, coupled 
with the imperatives of living in the slum of a megalopolis seemed to have spawned 
contradictory gender roles, with discursive constructions even more conflicted with social 
practice. The predominantly Bengali and Rohingya community, still frames masculinities and 
femininities in comparable terms to the Pashtuns in a somewhat ethnic idiom to contrast 
themselves with their Urdu speaking (Mohajir) neighbors, e.g. when talking about 
neighborhood women organizing to go and protest against lack of water supply a respondent 
said:
They might go, I do not know about them. My neighbour is a Mohajir. She tried to 
gather all the women to go for a protest. She often tells us that she has visited the 
water utility office, and the office people asked her to bring all the women so they 
have evidence of a lack of water supply, but we cannot go. Our husbands will not 
allow us, nor we will go. Like you are a Mohajir, you can go everywhere, we cannot 
[The Research Assistant was a Mohajir]. A Mohajir woman can share her husband’s 
burden by working in the factory, a Bengali women cannot. We Bengali women will 
die of hunger but will never go to a protest. In our community, women freely 
roaming on the streets is not considered good. Husbands do not want their wives to 
mingle with other males, that is why we face so many restrictions (Woman 
respondent A, AASG, Karachi, 23/01/15)
But the gendered social practice is a lot more complex than the above quote would have us 
believe. The women are, almost universally engaged in commercial enterprises like weaving, 
carpet making etc. even if it is from home. Furthermore, the lack of education for the women 
is not so much because of a cultural proscription, but mostly because of the lack of 
affordability, poverty, and lack of safe transport options to access spaces of education. It is a 
routine occurrence within the community for young women to run away and marry young 
men of their own choice. The exercise of that choice, nevertheless exposes them to further 
violence, because the idiom of shame, and dishonor, although not able to proscribe their 
behavior, nevertheless, opens them to community and household opprobrium, often 
expressed violently, e.g.
We had a fight and I separated [from my ex-husband]. So, I moved into my father’s 
house. I lived there for a year. My ex-husband did not visit or support me financially. I 
bore my own expenses by again starting the ‘adda work’ (textile weaving workshop). 
But now I had to pay my father as well, more than I used to give him before. Nobody 
liked me, and in order to live in the same house I had to pay money to my father. My 
father said that I won’t keep you in the house [because I ran away and married of my 
own choice]. I said I will work and pay you. He agreed to let me stay for the money but 
he beat me and insulted me all the time. . .  I had to give money to my father and a 
younger brother, Hira baji [the local facilitator] knew him. He also used to beat me 
severely [for dishonouring the family]. It is because of these people that I got married 
[of my own accord] again (Female Respondent H, AASG, Karachi, 21/01/2015).
While the above account displays remarkable agency in terms of earning a livelihood and 






























































nevertheless fraught with violence for women. For men too, living in a highly monetized 
commercial capital of the country, means different visions of what it means to be a man, e.g.,
We Burmese-Bengali boys of 18-30 are confronting complex challenges. Our elders’ 
and parents’ livelihood was fishing--catch fish, distribute fish. The young people 
however, don’t want to do this kind of work. They want to work during the day and 
stay at home at night. They don’t want to go on the fishing boats that take you for 6 
to 7 days out to the sea, and which require working day and night. They prefer working 
in factories like garments, hosiery etc. But even in these jobs there are serious 
challenges (Male respondent K, AASG, Karachi, 15/05/2015).
The above respondent was an enforcer for the MQM that perpetrated violence in his daily 
life. His view of what young people want was confirmed many times during the course of the 
questionnaire surveys and interviews. Clearly the masculinity is being recast in the context of 
a contemporary urban capitalist economy and the lifestyle ambitions that are consonant with 
that economy. But the question of ethnic identity, class and then the ambition to participate 
in the urban economy intersect with the Pakistani state’s policies with respect to the GWOT, 
to spawn new geographies of gendered violence within these poor ethnic minority 
communities in Karachi and Islamabad. It is how the GWOT is integral to the ‘serious 
challenges’, what the above respondent calls pareshani (literally: worry) that we turn to in 
the next section. 
The DNA relationality of Terror and Violence
The structure of the two urban areas offers interesting contrasts and convergences, by virtue 
of their commercial and more governmental primary functions. The commercial and 
Industrial hub of Karachi has a vast proportion of its population living in informal settlements, 
about 60% by some estimates (Hasan and Raza 2015), which provides the working proletariat 
for the industrial and commercial establishments in the city. AASG is one of the poorest and 
most vulnerable neighborhoods, which hosts such a working population that is transitioning 
from its traditional fishing based livelihoods to industrial labour, and home workshop style 
production (Askari 2015). 
Afghan Basti was initially set up by Afghan refugees in the 1980s who found work in the 
nearby fruit and vegetable market as well as access to United Nations High Commission for 
Refugees (UNHCR) and other NGOs that were active in supporting the refugee population. 
That was also the time when Afghan refugees were favoured as symbolic of Pakistan’s role as 
a loyal cold warrior against the Soviets in Afghanistan, and as evidence of its Islamic identity 
and solidarity with fellow Muslim Afghans. Over a period of time, the Afghan refugees were 
largely displaced by Pakistani economic migrants and then internally displaced people who 
had moved to the city from nearby Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) province and the adjoining 
FATA. Both the neighbourhoods, according to our baseline survey, experienced extremely 
high levels of violence, both within the household and from perpetrators outside of it, 86% 
for Afghan abadi and paradoxically 67% in AASG reported being victims of violence. In AASG 
19% of the respondents refused to answer the question about being subjected to violence. 






























































triangulating with the ethnographic evidence, we learned that the violence levels were much 
higher than ended up being reported in through the questionnaire survey. 
In Rawalpindi/Islamabad according to our survey, there was much higher proportion of within 
household violence reported. Indeed, because of the particularities of the social milieu in 
Karachi, the incidence of criminal violence was much higher than Rawalpindi/Islamabad and 
hence it eclipsed the domestic violence in people’s consciousness. In reality, from our 
ethnographic evidence the incidence of domestic violence was just as high in Karachi as in 
Rawalpindi/Islamabad. Also, in AASG the respondents frequently referred to domestic 
violence in their neighborhood, even if they insisted that there was no such thing happening 
in their own household, e.g.,
There is a family in a house adjacent to our home. They beat their daughter in law 
very badly. Couple of times I intervene to sort out the matter. One day they beat her 
so badly that she was not able to walk for a week.” (Male BQ-375, Ali Akbar Shah Goth, 
Karachi, Circa 2015).
Even the supposedly private, domestic violence takes on a very public character in the lanes, 
and congested living quarters of the residents of the two neighbourhoods. The spectacle of 
the above type of violence and we would argue the cause for it, is not separate from the 
infrastructural context within which it actuates. We discuss each type of violence and the 
strands that connect local and global scale violence in the two subsections below.
Infrastructural Violence and the GWOT
Infrastructural violence (IV) is defined by Rogers and O’Neill (2012) in two forms. ‘Passive’ – 
is where there is an absence of key infrastructure (e.g. water, transport, education, housing) 
which, marginalises groups of people in terms of attaining their basic rights and being able to 
live life without being constantly distracted and anxious about attaining access to such 
infrastructure and services. ‘Active’ IV is where configurations of infrastructure are ‘designed 
to be violent’ by regulating normative social and territorial relations’ (p. 406). Haines (2017), 
for example, demonstrates how IV has shifted from the passive register, where indigenous 
citizens were excluded through poor road networks, to the active in the discussion and 
development of a highway in Belize. The active IV again does not necessarily mean that there 
is a clear intent for the infrastructure to be a cause of violence. Instead, the very spatial 
configurations of the infrastructure, and who it caters to and not, and how violence flows 
from it is the pivotal question here. 
In Pakistan, the state’s narrative on its role in the GWOT vacillates between two contradictory 
but concurrent tropes—the dominant one is that terrorist violence within Pakistan is a 
conspiracy on part of the arch rival India, and its protégé Afghanistan to destabilize Pakistan. 
The second framing, favoured by the liberal intelligentsia but largely frowned upon by the 
state apparatus, especially the deep state, is that religious radicalization supported by the 
Saudi and Pakistani states to mobilize non-state actors to fight the Jihad against the Soviets 
in Afghanistan, and then against the Indian Army in Kashmir, may be the cause of the violence 
(Abbas 2005, Siddiqa 2007). In the former framing the foreigners, e.g., the Afghan refugees 
and Burmese Rohingyas, for example, are the fifth column of the enemy. Therefore, the 






























































the main conduit for doing that is greater scrutiny of applicants for issuance of the Biometric 
Computerized National Identity Card (CNIC), especially of applicants belonging to ethnic 
minorities, whose Pakistaniness may be suspect (also see Anwar 2014). Institution of 
citizenship documents such as a CNIC is part of a continuum of state formation, but in case of 
South Asia that seemingly convenient exercise in making citizenship legible and numerate has 
morphed into an instrument of exclusion and securitization (e.g., see Fluri et al. 2015). This 
has implications in terms of passive IV because the CNIC is the currency of access to state 
infrastructure, and as we will illustrate is an important material strand linking local and global 
violence. With the increasing securitization of the Pakistani society, this extends to jobs, 
schools, hospitals, transport and any housing in the formal sector, and progressively even in 
the informal sector. Burmese Rohingyas, Bengali speaking Pakistanis as well as Pashtun 
Pakistanis—who share ethno-linguistic ties with Afghans, are at a particular disadvantage 
when it comes to getting CNICs, especially if they are poor. As one enforcer for MQM in AASG 
explained, his life choices of being an extortionist and a gangster were to some extent a 
function of this lack of access to a CNIC:
The biggest challenge is of the identity card, which NADRA refuses to make for us. The 
ID card is necessary to get a job in a factory and our parents also don’t have ID cards 
either. If there is no CNIC then getting a job is not possible. We cannot buy a ticket to 
travel, children can’t be admitted to school, we cannot get a birth certificate, if we get 
married we cannot sort out the nikahnama (marriage certificate), we can’t open a 
bank account, cannot have a property in our name and we cannot lease a property in 
our name. When young boys cannot get their citizenship rights, and if they feel 
deprived, what pathways are left for them? In Ali Akbar Shah Goth there are dozens 
of boys who have already chosen a path of trouble. They are following the wrong path 
just as I am, and these boys who are here. What are we to do? . . . If we are walking 
along the police harasses us. When we don’t have an ID card, they throw us in prison, 
and let us go once we pay them off. This is how government agencies treat us. When 
we work for the political party here, they too take advantage of us…. Life is hell for 
the Burmese Bengalis (Male respondent K, AASG, Karachi, 15/05/2015).
This person extorted protection money from local businesses, and was wanted in multiple 
cases of theft, robbery and assault by the police. Our researcher met him at his den. But his 
story was repeated many times over in AASG and in Afghan Basti. For example, a woman 
whose uncle was shot 5 times by the MQM workers for being a worker of a rival political party 
said the following:
My uncle was associated with political activities because of scarcity of resources. My 
family faces the fate that it does because the state can’t protect us [I don’t expect the 
people who shot my uncle and bread earner to be caught]. We are not able to cover 
our basic needs and the state does not provide any relief in this regard. My uncle was 
attracted towards political activities because that’s the only way he saw that he could 
get recognition and along with it, some money (female respondent S, AASG, Karachi, 
18/01/2015).
Another woman, H in AASG - whose 38 year old husband was reportedly suffering from lung 
cancer - blamed the state for her husband’s illness. In her view because her husband did not 






























































The clinical explanation for her husband’s poor health, or the exact nature of the diagnoses is 
not the question here. The question is how Pakistani state’s policies in relation to the GWOT 
map on to lives of women like H or S or a man like K to produce acute cases of infrastructural 
violence, insofar as their violent lives are the outcome of being denied access to state and 
non-state infrastructure. 
In Afghan basti too, the same story was repeated in terms of lack of access to CNIC and then 
absence of any health, education or water infrastructure. Passive infrastructural violence also 
manifests itself in terms of insecurity of housing, which was deemed to be imbricated with 
gendered violence and it also shifts to active modes in terms of the police surveillance and 
treatment of the populations, e.g.,
The biggest violence in our lives is that we do not own the land we live on. We are 
threatened every day to evacuate this place. When we don’t comply they use other 
ways like police raids and take our men to the prison for many days. Our houses are 
made of mud (you can see) which create problems in the heavy rain. We live in dirt 
and our children play in the dirt, and get sick. We don’t have any hospital facility here. 
I think all the violence is because our lives are miserable. Being a woman I feel that 
women have no importance in men’s lives. I see my neighbours and relatives beaten 
and abused by their men. But man is the pillar of home and the bread earner so we 
have to endure (Female respondent ISL-AA-F2, Afghan Basti, Circa 2014). 
I think men are more vulnerable in this community. We are insecure due to police, 
government, everything. We have to defend against all the threats towards the family. 
Yes we sometimes beat our women but in return we love them a lot too, even more 
than their expectations. . . . To some extent we are fairly sorted in terms of 
employment, but as far as role of police and govt. is concerned it is very difficult to 
have a peaceful day. Every morning we fear getting arrested by the police. On the 
other hand, we also know that we cannot ask anyone to help us against this police 
violence. Whatever we earn and save, we have to give that money to police and in 
return they don’t file fake cases against us (Male Respondent F. Afghan Basti, 
Islamabad, Circa 2014).
As the above quotes illustrate, the material conditions of deprivation and the internalization 
of the gender roles combine to form a violent environment. Most of the men work in the 
nearby vegetable market and face routinized public violence, not just in relation to their 
ethnicity, which we will discuss later, but also by virtue of their class. This is not irrelevant to 
the gendered violence that occurs within the households as described in the above quote. As 
aforementioned, the GWOT and the Taliban insurgency are often equated by the Pakistani 
elite and state actors with the Pashtun ethnic groups. The police harassment of Pashtuns in 
particular in Rawalpindi/Islamabad as well as Karachi is a function of equating Pashtun 
ethnicity with the Taliban—even though there is a sizeable representation of the dominant 
Punjabi ethnicity amongst their ranks (Rana 2004). The harassment is illustrative of the DNA 
relationality, where stereotype driven by global scale processes, contributes to everyday 
violence. Figure 3, is a photo taken by one of our male participatory photography participants 
in Afghan Abadi. It shows a policeman being followed like the pied piper, by street children 
with sacks. The policeman routinely turns over vendors stalls and carts for one violation or 






























































the policeman so that they can pick off any fruits and vegetables that fall to the ground as the 
carts and stalls are turned over. This type of routinized violence also in a DNA like structure 
links to the extreme paranoia about female sexuality and almost draconian measures to 
control female mobility, even if it means subjecting elder men and women to back-breaking 
labour of fetching water or fuel (Figure 4), e.g.:
Our men will kill us [if we went out]. A young woman is not allowed to go out. These 
jobs [of fetching water and fuel] can only be done by either men or by old women of 
the family (Female respondent N, Afghan Basti, Circa 2014).
Figure 3: A policeman being followed by street children in the vegetable market where most 






























































Figure 4: An elderly man collecting coal bricks for fuel in Afghan Abadi (Source: Faisal).
The above is an illustration of twin affective and material strands that link local scale violence 
caused by bruised masculinities and exclusion from accessing infrastructure, respectively, 
with global scale war on terror.
The interlinkages between the GWOT and infrastructural violence do not all stem from 
questions of correct documentation. The interlinkages also emanate from the cultural change 
that has been brought on in Pakistan as a result of its antecedent to post 911 GWOT, 
involvement with the Saudi and American funded Afghan Jihad against the Soviets in the 
1980s. Starting with the ingress of more rightist literalist Islam with Saudi funded madrasas 
in the 1980-90s (Abbas 2005, Rashid 2009), in the post 911 era, the battle lines of identity 
pan-Islamic religious identity have been drawn much more categorically as documented by 
Maqsood (2014). The more rightist literalist Islam has found its votaries in the first instance 
with the urban middle classes. This religious strand within the DNA like relationality between 
the global and local scale, inflects access to infrastructure, as this 18 year old woman, 
pregnant with her 7th child (she insists she is 18 and it is her 7th child) narrated, when asked if 
she would prefer to give birth in a hospital.
I have heard that when women recite “dua darood” [A customary prayer used by 
Sufism inspired Muslims. Orthodox deem it to be un-Islamic], the nurses curse the 
woman. Mohajir women [who are typically better off] yell and abuse the patients 
more than any Bengali staff. They say, ‘if you are in so much pain why did you bear a 






























































that He keep me safe from the hospital. . . . I have begged my husband that whatever 
happens to me, do not take me to the hospital, not even if I am dying (Woman 
respondent A, AASG, Karachi, 23/01/15).
Verbal abuse, and threats of violence are also violence, and in this instance, can be 
conceptualized as infrastructural violence, insofar as the need to access that infrastructure 
gets imbricated with violence. The nurses that disapprove of ‘dua darood’ may very well be 
inspired by the rightist literalist Islamic movements in the country, that have made significant 
ingress among the middle classes (Ahmad 2008). The religious angle when intersecting with 
class dynamics infuses the palliative infrastructure of a hospital with violence. The 
infrastructural violence, however is also complemented by spectacular gendered violence, 
much the same as the more national and international scale terrorist violence.
 
Spectacular Violence and the GWOT
Following Arendt’s theorisation, everyday violence in the AASG and Afghan Basti is borne of 
a loss of power. Das (1996) demonstrates how the Indian state normalizes sexual violence 
through its judicial practices, where the women’s bodies are produced at the intersection of 
discourses on sexuality and male kinship alliances. The female and male bodies are indeed 
sites of contestation over citizenship, masculinity and femininity, and the violence visited 
upon them changes the agency and texture of spaces and places within these communities. 
The link between global terrorist and everyday violence is again evocative of the DNA 
relationality that we have posited above. Violence in the two neighbourhoods of Afghan Basti 
and AASG, like terrorist violence uses a visual grammar of shock and awe to diminish the 
agency of the victims as political subjects, but simultaneously it eviscerates the perpetrators 
as legitimate protectors of female virtue, or ethnic identity (see Pain 2015). In fact, in the 
spectacles of violence enacted in the two neighbourhoods, there is almost an aspect of 
sublime violence whereby the, “perpetrators and victims transform themselves into 
instruments of forces that are believed to be greater than themselves” (Verkaaik 2013: 111).
One of the strategies of threatened masculinities in Afghan Basti of control over women is 
their almost complete restriction to the private sphere, as discussed in the previous section. 
This control is enforced through intense physical violence, which because of the very 
geographies in which it is enacted gives it a very public characteristic, e.g.,
We are spending our lives like prisoners here. We are prisoners without being in a 
proper prison. We can’t even take a single step without getting permission from our 
men. My husband beats me like an animal without any reason, in front of the whole 
family, including children. It’s not only about me, my sister in law is also facing the 
same issues. We don’t have any self-respect. We are like the men’s servants. 
Important thing is that my mother in law also encourages her son and participates in 
abusing and beating us (Female respondent Z, Afghan Basti, Circa 2014).
Such intentionally spectacular violence doesn’t just serve as a mode of control and 
constriction of spaces for female agency, but also as an enactment of masculinity in an 
environment where the masculinity itself is deeply eviscerated by the state. Achilli (2015) 
discusses a comparable situation of the hegemonic masculinities in the Palestinian refugee 






























































masculinity as superior in some ways to the dominant trans-Jordanian masculinity. The 
aggressive or pious, Palestinian camp masculinity, however, exists in a tension with the more 
feminine masculinity requiring docility and compliance in the face of the Jordanian state and 
society (Achilli 2015). The spectacular violence here, on the one hand serves to underline the 
aggressive, in control, masculinity of the men, and on the other serve as a warning to 
everyone else. The undercurrent in the enactment of that masculinity is the complete docility 
in the face of the state and its security apparatus, necessitated in no small part by GWOT.
In AASG, the relationship between MQM, the state and the populace is another dynamic 
deeply imbricated with the GWOT. MQM, as discussed above, positions itself a secular ethno-
nationalist party, which found favour with the pro-US military government of General Pervaiz 
Musharraf in the 2000s. Although it is currently out of favour with the government, its links 
to western intelligence agencies and patronage, in particular by British intelligence is an open 
secret (Bennett-Jones 2013). MQM was not averse to public humiliation and gendered 
violence, beyond target killings to affirm its control of public spaces and to chastise the 
populace about the futility of resistance against its control (Verkaaik 2013). One of our 
respondents had to abandon going to school, partly because she was harassed by MQM 
workers for being the niece of an opposition party worker. Her uncle was killed by an MQM 
hitman:
After [my brother’s] departure [to Bahrain], MQM workers harassed us, especially me. 
When I went to school, MQM workers standing in the lane would shout, ‘look! Look! 
Alam’s niece is going to school!’ As long as my father was keeping good health, I could 
go to school. But when he became ill [and couldn’t protect us, or provide for us], I had 
to discontinue my education (Female participant H, AASG, Karachi, 1/18/2015).
Such harassment and taunting of the girl did not serve any particular function, beyond serving 
as a warning to others of what happens to the families of people who dare challenge the writ 
of the party. So pervasive was the impression of the efficacy of the MQM in perpetrating 
violence that even in familial feuds, the MQM could intervene, or was perceived to have the 
ability to intervene on the side of one of the parties, or the other. One of our respondents 
was subjected to a public beating based upon a false rumour that she had commissioned to 
have her estranged husband killed off by the MQM. She hadn’t, and he was alive:
[My former husband’s sisters] dragged me into the street by my hair and beat me up. 
My mother was expecting at the time and she miscarried in all the jostling. They were 
beating me and crying loudly (Female respondent H, AASG, 21/01/2015).
In a culture of violence, where everyone’s life and dignity is under threat, rumours about 
someone being killed by the MQM, were deemed credible. It was also credible that her 
estranged wife had commissioned the killing, especially since the husband himself was 
accused of killing someone else on a personal matter, and was technically in hiding. And then 
it was also quite opportune that the family of the husband deemed it fit to attack the woman’s 
house in a state of rage and grief, and subject her and her mother to torture in a public way. 
Such spectacles, along with many, many others narrated to us paint a picture of a social milieu 
where gendered violence is the currency of negotiating personal and social conflict. The 
violent spectacle and its context are mutually co-constituted, as local to national scale 






























































local and global scales (Pain 2015, Fluri . The spectacle of violence is combined with an 
extreme difficulty in making claims upon the state or society for protection. The politics of 
appearance in the Arendtian sense (1973) or the politics of negotiating relationship between 
the individual and the state are deeply dysfunctional in this context. So, all that is left for the 
actors is to engage in the subliminal spectacle of violence, much the same as the actors at the 
national and international scale (Verkaaik 2013). In the current scenario, local citizens hold 
very little hope, if any, for other avenues of protection, or access to basic citizenship rights.
Conclusion
The violence visited upon the Pashtun women’s bodies is not separate from the evisceration 
of the Pashtun masculinity by state violence. The pervasive gendered violence in the Rohingya 
community is deeply intertwined with the state’s delegitimizing of the Rohingya identity as 
foreign, and the MQM’s appropriation of their bodies to achieve politico-criminal ends. In 
either case, the loss of power underlying gendered violence is imbricated with the: politics of 
non-recognition by the state; affects of unfulfilled gendered expectations of men as 
breadwinners or women as caregivers; cultural tropes of urban consumerist expectations in 
the city; and encounters with the state. We have tried to demonstrate how the politics, 
affects, cultural tropes and encounters, instead of being in a stable nested hierarchy, weave 
into a double helix like structure representing the DNA like relationality between the local 
every day violence, and the national and global geopolitics. The war on terror and everyday 
violence are co-produced, and we have presented evidence to the effect of how they are in 
Pakistan.
The co-productive relation between the GWOT for example, and everyday terror is illustrated 
more subtly by infrastructural violence of exclusion from access to state services, or 
impregnation of those services with violence. The relational linkage between terrorism and 
everyday violence is a theme running through our argument, but it comes into sharp focus in 
the discussion on creation of different masculinities and femininities. How contemporary 
Pashtun and Bengali/Rohingya masculinities are enacted violently is mediated by the history 
of reinforcing certain orientalist gender stereotypes in the context of GWOT on the one hand, 
and the compulsions of participation in a capitalist economy on the other.
Every day violence mimics the spatial strategies of spectacular violence most closely 
associated with international terror. Gendered violence is enacted both privately and 
publicly, and in the register of redeeming some masculine authority in the face of eviscerating 
state violence. Terrorist violence, similarly is enacted in the face of a West that has dealt all 
political cards to itself, leaving anyone outside of its ontological truth regimes the only 
weapon available, the (apolitical) spectacle (Jones and Clarke 2006: 307).
State, non-state, criminal and domestic violence all are co-constituted, gendered and 
intersectional. The spatial strategies of violence at the local every day and episodic national 
and international terror are ultimately about constricting spaces for public life (Mustafa et al. 
2013). The younger women in Afghan Basti are denied access to the public sphere, young 
men’s experience of certain spaces is deeply intertwined with violence. If there is a villain that 
emerges in this violent spatial drama, it is the state that through its spatial strategies of 






























































everyday level and the scale of global terror. Any discussion of global terror and every day 
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